- The Definition of Elenchus
The Euthyphro is a good example of the Socratic practice of elenchus (“cross-examining”). Formally stated, elenchus is a process of examining and refuting propositions (usually a series of propositions proposed as definitions for some interesting eidos) in dialogue with another, where the dialogue is motivated by a concern for truth. In the Euthyphro, as in other dialogues, one person offers a definition of an important idea, which proposed definition is examined and refuted. Another, better definition is then formulated in light of what was wrong with the first. This second definition is then also examined and refuted, opening the way for a third and better definition, and so on. If the idea under definition is central to human self-understanding, then the process of definition is theoretically without limit, though it makes progress toward an absolute and final definition. The theoretical unlimitedness of the progress toward definition is a function of the constitutional limitation of human beings and human knowledge.[1] Elenchus is a moral as well as an intellectual exercise; part of its function is to deflate the unwarranted self-confidence of prior opinion. To the extent that a Socratic interlocutor is dogmatically committed to his opinions, elenchus reduces him to a state of aporia (confusion or helpless perplexity, literally, “no port”) which is the image of his true state.
One of the presuppositions of the elenchic method is that learning takes place not through the passive reception of information, but through the active correction of prior belief. The idea is that we are capable of learning to the extent that we are able to expose our beliefs to the risk of refutation, and that we actually do learn to the extent that they are shown to be in error. It is, of course, not enough just to be informed that some of your opinions are in error; to learn, you must also understand why they are in error. It is part of the Socratic ideal to test the most fundamental of your relevant beliefs in any situation in order to deepen your understanding of what you are doing in that situation.
Part of the moral aim of elenchus is to free its practitioners from the compulsive tyranny of opinion and to put their beliefs in service to the pursuit of truth by expressing and examining them honestly so that action that hinges on those beliefs will be honest and responsible. Succinctly put, elenchus is a dialogical process of pursuing truth, in belief and action, through the explication and testing of one’s beliefs. The constant practice of elenchus is part of the Socratic ideal of living the examined life.
Of the four classical virtues, elenchus specifically requires courage, for you must first state what you believe and then examine that belief without letting your ego or ulterior interests get involved. The courage that is required is really the courage of honesty. Honesty is a concern for the truth as it is regardless of practical consequences. And the courage of honesty is tested when practical matters are at issue. Thus, elenchus requires honesty, and honesty requires courage when the questions are real, i.e., have consequences that matter.
Elenchus addresses highly general beliefs, but not inconsequential beliefs that have no bearing on your practical decisions. If you can change a certain belief when the change has no practical consequences, then that belief is not a candidate for elenchic examination. Socrates’ discussions are always highly abstract, but the dramatic settings of the dialogues make clear that there is always something quite concrete and practical at stake. The beliefs examined in elenchus are not idle or speculative, but working beliefs.
Elenchus is self-examination in the sense that it presses home questions like these: “What are you really doing? If you look at what you are up to in the light of your highest principles, what is your natural response? Shame or self-respect? Does it shame you to regard your action in the full light of your highest principles (so that you feel like quitting the discussion and not thinking about it), or do you find that you are acting consistently with your highest idea (so that you can regard what you are doing openly, with acceptance, without wanting to look away)?”
The dialogic process of elenchus aims to bring into question, and therefore to consciousness, the fundamental contours of the life that one is actually leading. To the extent that self-knowledge of this sort makes a person a better human being, elenchus promotes the moral improvement of its practitioners. It is therefore part of the practice of what we may call virtue (areté or excellence), since it helps to develop the unique potential of what it is to be a human being rather than a mere animal of cunning.
Elenchus requires the courage to put practical concerns aside and pursue the truth for its own sake. If one has sufficient courage for this, then one presumably has sufficient courage to allow the conclusions of that pursuit to have their full impact on those practical concerns. It’s somewhat ironic that the elenchic inquiry into truth is possible only when there are real concerns at stake (since it is those concerns that make the inquiry a real one), though the concerns at stake must not be allowed to affect one’s inquiry. It appears that honesty is a matter of maintaining the proper tension between theoretical inquiry and practical conduct, a tension that aligns and benefits both.
2. Digression on courage and belief
Elenchus requires courage, but even thinking about and stating what you honestly believe requires courage, and a certain amount of preliminary self-knowledge as well. In our feint-hearted moments, most of us would rather not believe anything. After all, belief carries the burden of responsibility. Owning a belief, you are then responsible for its justification; rather than holding it arbitrarily, you need to be able to give good reasons for it. (A belief is certainly no good—hardly a belief at all—if you are unable or unwilling to say anything persuasive about it.) It also carries certain risks. First, your belief may be in error. You are then liable to suffer the ego-bruising embarrassment of being shown to hold a false belief, as well as the intellectual pain of a temporary epistemic confusion. Second, you may find yourself alone and perhaps lonely in your belief. For a belief that you will hold only if it crosschecks with what other people think is merely a comfortable and provisional opinion, hardly an honest personal belief at all. And third, you risk a certain trauma to your self-respect (i.e., shame) should you find, upon reflection, that you are not acting according to your beliefs.
Sometimes I would like to avoid all the work and risk of personal belief and just believe what everyone else does or whatever the experts say (the anonymous “they”), and thus sink into the unthinking comfort of a mere animal or herd mentality. But in the anonymous or merely animal mind, there is no starting point for elenchus. Elenchus requires, rather, some of the courage of self-knowledge to begin with.
And the fact is that I can never really be just like everyone else in point of belief. For my beliefs arise out of the specific problems and prospects of my involvements in the world, and these involvements are, in sum and detail, historically unique. Their unique configuration requires constant independent thought if I am to live true to them; addressing and revising those beliefs, within a general awareness of the nature of my world, is the only way I have of thinking anew about who I am, where my world has come from, and where it is going. It is not practical to forego this thought, for the unexamined life is not worth living.
[1] Socrates’ elenchic conversations exhibit four general rules:
- You must say what you truly believe; nothing should be said hypothetically or merely for the sake of argument. This helps keep the discussion relevant to the genuine concerns of the people involved.
- You may change your mind at any point in the discussion; the whole point of elenchus, after all, is to straighten and correct reflective belief, so certainly you should be able to make such corrections as you go along and not be forced to keep to what you say at first.
- The issue of the conversation must be real; that is, the issue, though pursued on the level of theory, must be a practical one the outcome of which will make a difference to one’s decisions.
- The participants in the conversation must find agreement at each step of the conversation. The only test of truth available to the conversationalists is that of agreement between them. If the conversation is to progress toward truth, the partners must remain in agreement.